Internet-Draft Use of HPKE in JOSE July 2024
Reddy, et al. Expires 8 January 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
JOSE
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt-01
Published:
Intended Status:
Standards Track
Expires:
Authors:
T. Reddy
Nokia
H. Tschofenig
A. Banerjee
Nokia
O. Steele
Transmute
M. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting

Use of Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) with JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)

Abstract

This specification defines Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) for use with JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE). HPKE offers a variant of public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts for a recipient public key.

HPKE works for any combination of an asymmetric key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), key derivation function (KDF), and authenticated encryption with additional data (AEAD) function. Authentication for HPKE in JOSE is provided by JOSE-native security mechanisms or by one of the authenticated variants of HPKE.

This document defines the use of the HPKE with JOSE.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-hpke-encrypt/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the jose Working Group mailing list (mailto:jose@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/jose/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose/.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 January 2025.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) [RFC9180] is a scheme that provides public key encryption of arbitrary-sized plaintexts given a recipient's public key.

This specification enables JSON Web Encryption (JWE) to leverage HPKE, bringing support for KEMs and the possibility of Post Quantum or Hybrid KEMs to JWE.

2. Conventions and Definitions

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

3. Conventions and Terminology

This specification uses the following abbreviations and terms:

4. Overview

This specification describes two modes of use for HPKE in JWE:

When "alg" and "enc" are both present in a protected header and when "iv" and "tag" are empty, the mode is HPKE JWE Integrated Encryption.

When "enc" is present in a protected header and "alg" is absent, the mode is HPKE JWE Key Encryption when a valid HPKE "alg" value is present in the unprotected headers.

HPKE supports several modes, which are described in Table 1 of [RFC9180].

In JWE, the use of specific HPKE modes such as "mode_base" or "mode_auth_psk" is determined by the presence of the header parameters "psk_id" and "auth_kid".

JWE supports different serializations, including Compact JWE Serialization as described in Section 3.1 of [RFC7516], General JWE JSON Serialization as described in Section 3.2 of [RFC7516].

Certain JWE features are only supported in specific serializations.

For example Compact JWE Serialization does not support the following:

HPKE JWE Key Encryption can be used with "aad" but only when not expressed with Compact JWE Serialization.

Single recipient HPKE JWE Key Encryption with no "aad" can be expressed in Compact JWE Serialization, so long as the recipient and sender use the same HPKE Setup process as described in { Section 5 of RFC9180 }.

4.1. Auxiliary Authenticated Application Information

HPKE has two places at which applications can specify auxiliary authenticated information as described in { Section 8.1 of RFC9180 }.

HPKE algorithms are not required to process "apu" and "apv" as described in Section 4.6.1 of [RFC7518], despite appearing to be similar to key agreement algorithms (such as "ECDH-ES").

The "Setup info" MUST NOT be used with either HPKE JWE Integrated Encryption and HPKE JWE Key Encryption.

The "aad parameter" for Open() and Seal() MUST be used with both HPKE JWE Integrated Encryption and HPKE JWE Key Encryption.

To avoid confusion between JWE AAD and HPKE AAD, this document uses the term "HPKE AEAD AAD" to refer the "aad parameter" for Open() and Seal().

The HPKE AEAD AAD MUST be set to the "JWE Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter" defined in Step 14 of Section 5.1 of [RFC7516] which is repeated here for clarity:

Let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be ASCII(Encoded Protected Header). However, if a JWE AAD value is present (which can only be the case when using the JWE JSON Serialization), instead let the Additional Authenticated Data encryption parameter be ASCII(Encoded Protected Header || '.' || BASE64URL(JWE AAD)).

4.2. Encapsulated Keys

Encapsulated keys MUST be the base64url encoded encapsulated key as defined in Section 5.1.1 of [RFC9180].

In HPKE JWE Integrated Encryption, JWE Encrypted Key is the encapsulated key.

In HPKE JWE Key Encryption, each recipient JWE Encrypted Key is the encrypted content encryption key, and the encapsulated key is found in the recipient header.

5. Integrated Encryption

In HPKE JWE Integrated Encryption:

6. Key Encryption

HPKE based recipients can be added alongside existing ECDH-ES+A128KW or RSA-OAEP-384 recipients because HPKE is only used to encrypt the content encryption key, and because the protected header used in content encryption is passed to HPKE as Additional Authenticated Data.

In HPKE JWE Key Encryption:

7. Security Considerations

This specification is based on HPKE and the security considerations of [RFC9180] are therefore applicable also to this specification.

HPKE assumes the sender is in possession of the public key of the recipient and HPKE JOSE makes the same assumptions. Hence, some form of public key distribution mechanism is assumed to exist but outside the scope of this document.

HPKE in Base mode does not offer authentication as part of the HPKE KEM. In this case JOSE constructs like JWS and JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) can be used to add authentication. HPKE also offers modes that offer authentication.

HPKE relies on a source of randomness to be available on the device. In Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode, CEK has to be randomly generated and it MUST be ensured that the guidelines in [RFC8937] for random number generations are followed.

7.1. Plaintext Compression

Implementers are advised to review Section 3.6 of [RFC8725], which states: Compression of data SHOULD NOT be done before encryption, because such compressed data often reveals information about the plaintext.

7.2. Header Parameters

Implementers are advised to review Section 3.10 of [RFC8725], which comments on application processing of JWE Protected Headers. Additionally, Unprotected Headers can contain similar information which an attacker could leverage to mount denial of service, forgery or injection attacks.

7.3. Ensure Cryptographic Keys Have Sufficient Entropy

Implementers are advised to review Section 3.5 of [RFC8725], which provides comments on entropy requirements for keys. This guidance is relevant to both public and private keys used in both Key Encryption and Integrated Encryption. Additionally, this guidance is applicable to content encryption keys used in Key Encryption mode.

7.4. Validate Cryptographic Inputs

Implementers are advised to review Section 3.4 of [RFC8725], which provides comments on the validation of cryptographic inputs. This guidance is relevant to both public and private keys used in both Key Encryption and Integrated Encryption, specifically focusing on the structure of the public and private keys. These inputs are crucial for the HPKE KEM operations.

7.5. Use Appropriate Algorithms

Implementers are advised to review Section 3.2 of [RFC8725], which comments on the selection of appropriate algorithms. This is guidance is relevant to both Key Encryption and Integrated Encryption. When using Key Encryption, the strength of the content encryption algorithm should not be significantly different from the strengh of the Key Encryption algorithms used.

8. IANA Considerations

This document adds entries to [JOSE-IANA].

8.1. Ciphersuite Registration

This specification registers a number of ciphersuites for use with HPKE. A ciphersuite is a group of algorithms, often sharing component algorithms such as hash functions, targeting a security level. An HPKE ciphersuite, is composed of the following choices:

  • HPKE Mode

  • KEM Algorithm

  • KDF Algorithm

  • AEAD Algorithm

The "KEM", "KDF", and "AEAD" values are chosen from the HPKE IANA registry [HPKE-IANA].

For readability the algorithm ciphersuites labels are built according to the following scheme:

HPKE-<KEM>-<KDF>-<AEAD>

The "HPKE Mode" is described in Table 1 of [RFC9180]:

  • "Base" refers to "mode_base" described in Section 5.1.1 of [RFC9180], which only enables encryption to the holder of a given KEM private key.

  • "PSK" refers to "mode_psk", described in Section 5.1.2 of [RFC9180], which authenticates using a pre-shared key.

  • "Auth" refers to "mode_auth", described in Section 5.1.3 of [RFC9180], which authenticates using an asymmetric key.

  • "Auth_Psk" refers to "mode_auth_psk", described in Section 5.1.4 of [RFC9180], which authenticates using both a PSK and an asymmetric key.

Implementations detect the use of modes by inspecting header parameters.

8.2. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms

The following entries are added to the "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms" registry:

8.2.1. HPKE-P256-SHA256-A128GCM

  • Algorithm Name: HPKE-P256-SHA256-A128GCM

  • Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for JOSE-HPKE in Base Mode that uses the DHKEM(P-256, HKDF-SHA256) KEM, the HKDF-SHA256 KDF and the AES-128-GCM AEAD.

  • Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

  • Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO

8.2.2. HPKE-P384-SHA384-A256GCM

  • Algorithm Name: HPKE-P384-SHA384-A256GCM

  • Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for JOSE-HPKE in Base Mode that uses the DHKEM(P-384, HKDF-SHA384) KEM, the HKDF-SHA384 KDF, and the AES-256-GCM AEAD.

  • Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

  • Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO

8.2.3. HPKE-P521-SHA512-A256GCM

  • Algorithm Name: HPKE-P521-SHA512-A256GCM

  • Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for JOSE-HPKE in Base Mode that uses the DHKEM(P-521, HKDF-SHA512) KEM, the HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and the AES-256-GCM AEAD.

  • Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

  • Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO

8.2.4. HPKE-X25519-SHA256-A128GCM

  • Algorithm Name: HPKE-X25519-SHA256-A128GCM

  • Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for JOSE-HPKE in Base Mode that uses the DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) KEM, the HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and the AES-128-GCM AEAD.

  • Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

  • Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO

8.2.5. HPKE-X25519-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305

  • Algorithm Name: HPKE-X25519-SHA256-ChaCha20Poly1305

  • Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for JOSE-HPKE in Base Mode that uses the DHKEM(X25519, HKDF-SHA256) KEM, the HKDF-SHA256 KDF, and the ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

  • Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg, enc"

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

  • Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO

8.2.6. HPKE-X448-SHA512-A256GCM

  • Algorithm Name: HPKE-X448-SHA512-A256GCM

  • Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for JOSE-HPKE in Base Mode that uses the DHKEM(X448, HKDF-SHA512) KEM, the HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and the AES-256-GCM AEAD.

  • Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

  • Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO

8.2.7. HPKE-X448-SHA512-ChaCha20Poly1305

  • Algorithm Name: HPKE-X448-SHA512-ChaCha20Poly1305

  • Algorithm Description: Cipher suite for JOSE-HPKE in Base Mode that uses the DHKEM(X448, HKDF-SHA512) KEM, the HKDF-SHA512 KDF, and the ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD.

  • Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"

  • JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

  • Algorithm Analysis Documents(s): TODO

8.3. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters

The following entries are added to the "JSON Web Key Parameters" registry:

8.3.1. ek

  • Header Parameter Name: "ek"

  • Header Parameter Description: An encapsulated key as defined in { Section 5.1.1 of RFC9180 }

  • Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

8.3.2. psk_id

  • Header Parameter Name: "psk_id"

  • Header Parameter Description: A key identifier (kid) for the pre-shared key as defined in { Section 5.1.2 of RFC9180 }

  • Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

8.3.3. auth_kid

  • Header Parameter Name: "auth_kid"

  • Header Parameter Description: A key identifier (kid) for the asymmetric key as defined in { Section 5.1.3 of RFC9180 }

  • Header Parameter Usage Location(s): JWE

  • Change Controller: IETF

  • Specification Document(s): RFCXXXX

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[JOSE-IANA]
IANA, "JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms", n.d., <https://www.iana.org/assignments/jose/jose.xhtml>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC7516]
Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7516>.
[RFC7517]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", RFC 7517, DOI 10.17487/RFC7517, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7517>.
[RFC7518]
Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518, DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7518>.
[RFC8174]
Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8725]
Sheffer, Y., Hardt, D., and M. Jones, "JSON Web Token Best Current Practices", BCP 225, RFC 8725, DOI 10.17487/RFC8725, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8725>.
[RFC9180]
Barnes, R., Bhargavan, K., Lipp, B., and C. Wood, "Hybrid Public Key Encryption", RFC 9180, DOI 10.17487/RFC9180, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9180>.

9.2. Informative References

[HPKE-IANA]
IANA, "Hybrid Public Key Encryption (HPKE) IANA Registry", , <https://www.iana.org/assignments/hpke/hpke.xhtml>.
[I-D.ietf-cose-hpke]
Tschofenig, H., Steele, O., Daisuke, A., and L. Lundblade, "Use of Hybrid Public-Key Encryption (HPKE) with CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-cose-hpke-07, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-cose-hpke-07>.
[RFC8937]
Cremers, C., Garratt, L., Smyshlyaev, S., Sullivan, N., and C. Wood, "Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols", RFC 8937, DOI 10.17487/RFC8937, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8937>.

Appendix A. Examples

The following examples contain newlines for readability.

This private key and it implied public key are used in the following examples:

{
  "kid": "S6AXfdU_6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s",
  "alg": "HPKE-P256-SHA256-A128GCM",
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "wt36K06T4T4APWfGtioqDBXCvRN9evqkZjNydib9MaM",
  "y": "eupgedeE_HAmVJ62kpSt2_EOoXb6e0y2YF1JPlfr1-I",
  "d": "O3KznUTAxw-ov-9ZokwNaJ289RgP9VxQc7GJthaXzWY"
}

This pre shared key is used in the following examples:

{
  "kty": "oct",
  "kid": "our-pre-shared-key-id",
  "k": "anVnZW11anVnZW11Z29rb3Vub3N1cmlraXJla2FpamE"
}

A.1. Integrated Encryption

A.1.1. Example 0

This example demonstrates the use of Integrated Encryption with Auth Mode and a Pre shared key.

The compact serialization is:

eyJhbGciOiJIUEtFLVAyNTYtU0hBMjU2LUExMjhHQ00iLCJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIiwi
a2lkIjoidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOm9hdXRoOmp3ay10aHVtYnByaW50OnNoYS0yNTY6
UzZBWGZkVV82WWZ6dnUwS0RESmIwc0Z1d25JV1BrNkxNVEVyWWhQYjMycyIsInBza19p
ZCI6Im91ci1wcmUtc2hhcmVkLWtleS1pZCIsImF1dGhfa2lkIjoidXJuOmlldGY6cGFy
YW1zOm9hdXRoOmp3ay10aHVtYnByaW50OnNoYS0yNTY6UzZBWGZkVV82WWZ6dnUwS0RE
SmIwc0Z1d25JV1BrNkxNVEVyWWhQYjMycyJ9.BL_K7-o0jtNcCtYfoFhgh42jPxrz4aW
1jvjeSyHnAXKsomGQ1VCvwjSduwaWJ1Ewrrh3G1vf94xJ_Bb9YwYE9JU..Fl0HsSaXA-
ICfSz97iRRW6qApb5MFQct9llEPvkL0gEim9GmrDm8REJcquETwdTTaGitDZ_IbnwTwk
57ic1nfyRjWTFzEZLs_IAqZphP2J6KcqKHHBJJraeTkN9r1kNrDP6yg4xqcceCVmcn_f
dd2Oudij-FlU2IXsQKRyo2B2H9Q2si.

The json serialization is:

{
  "protected":"eyJhbGciOiJIUEtFLVAyNTYtU0hBMjU2LUExMjhHQ00iLCJlbmMiO
  iJBMTI4R0NNIiwia2lkIjoidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOm9hdXRoOmp3ay10aHVtYnB
  yaW50OnNoYS0yNTY6UzZBWGZkVV82WWZ6dnUwS0RESmIwc0Z1d25JV1BrNkxNVEVyW
  WhQYjMycyIsInBza19pZCI6Im91ci1wcmUtc2hhcmVkLWtleS1pZCIsImF1dGhfa2l
  kIjoidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOm9hdXRoOmp3ay10aHVtYnByaW50OnNoYS0yNTY6U
  zZBWGZkVV82WWZ6dnUwS0RESmIwc0Z1d25JV1BrNkxNVEVyWWhQYjMycyJ9",

  "encrypted_key":"BL_K7-o0jtNcCtYfoFhgh42jPxrz4aW1jvjeSyHnAXKsomGQ1
  VCvwjSduwaWJ1Ewrrh3G1vf94xJ_Bb9YwYE9JU",

  "ciphertext":"Fl0HsSaXA-ICfSz97iRRW6qApb5MFQct9llEPvkL0gEim9GmrDm8
  REJcquETwdTTaGitDZ_IbnwTwk57ic1nfyRjWTFzEZLs_IAqZphP2J6KcqKHHBJJra
  eTkN9r1kNrDP6yg4xqcceCVmcn_fdd2Oudij-FlU2IXsQKRyo2B2H9Q2si"
}

The decoded protected header is:

{
  "alg": "HPKE-P256-SHA256-A128GCM",
  "enc": "A128GCM",
  "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzv
  u0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s",
  "psk_id": "our-pre-shared-key-id",
  "auth_kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_
  6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s"
}

The decrypted plaintext is:

{
  "urn:example:claim":true,
  "iss":"urn:example:issuer",
  "aud":"urn:example:audience",
  "iat":1720387513,
  "exp":1720394713
}

A.1.2. Example 1

This example demonstrates the use of Integrated Encryption with Auth Mode and a Pre shared key as well as JWE Additional Authenticated Data.

There is way to express a JWE with aad in Compact JWE Serialization.

{
  "protected":"eyJhbGciOiJIUEtFLVAyNTYtU0hBMjU2LUExMjhHQ00iLCJlbmMiO
  iJBMTI4R0NNIiwia2lkIjoidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOm9hdXRoOmp3ay10aHVtYnB
  yaW50OnNoYS0yNTY6UzZBWGZkVV82WWZ6dnUwS0RESmIwc0Z1d25JV1BrNkxNVEVyW
  WhQYjMycyIsInBza19pZCI6Im91ci1wcmUtc2hhcmVkLWtleS1pZCIsImF1dGhfa2l
  kIjoidXJuOmlldGY6cGFyYW1zOm9hdXRoOmp3ay10aHVtYnByaW50OnNoYS0yNTY6U
  zZBWGZkVV82WWZ6dnUwS0RESmIwc0Z1d25JV1BrNkxNVEVyWWhQYjMycyJ9",

  "encrypted_key":"BPlPRS-eX1m6zcxNScg4f_W6-eZTvu9n0F-wUcTuJZNsnf7Z1
  wasEW_g4sdbhFiDxBdd1_gCtyXpAatukbunN_I",

  "ciphertext":"RM7Bhz3WHSTeVYDlzLuYMhvECfKXhFIJPgMb1gUGMMkyUZeR",

  "aad":"8J-PtOKAjeKYoO-4jyBiZXdhcmUgdGhlIGFhZCE"
}

The decoded protected header is:

{
  "alg": "HPKE-P256-SHA256-A128GCM",
  "enc": "A128GCM",
  "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_6Yfzv
  u0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s",
  "psk_id": "our-pre-shared-key-id",
  "auth_kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:S6AXfdU_
  6Yfzvu0KDDJb0sFuwnIWPk6LMTErYhPb32s"
}

The decrypted plaintext is:

🖤 this plaintext!

The decoded aad is:

🏴‍☠️ beware the aad!

A.2. Key Encryption

A.2.1. Example 2

This example demonstrates the use of Key Encryption with Auth Mode and a Pre shared key, in both Compact JWE Serialization and General JWE JSON Serialization.

 eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0.S_y3YPaLfjiwGz5o65BHciu14AZv-0J4Kzgtp2s7p7Q
 .EfX5ELXllga3S6Xx.up_VjB87-VSXd7d5ycPmhK9RtHx6vxOQJNjHjcqdrNKAWJcqb
 QEFzypSRhtSn9GmmlRQKl2j0DxUbT9q9mVZ.PutkemRFtDPkog7lh3aqbw

Note that the recipient structure is destroyed when converting to compact serialization, and that "ek" moves to "encrypted_key".

{
  "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
  "iv": "EfX5ELXllga3S6Xx",
  "ciphertext": "up_VjB87-VSXd7d5ycPmhK9RtHx6vxOQJNjHjcqdrNKAWJcqbQE
  FzypSRhtSn9GmmlRQKl2j0DxUbT9q9mVZ",
  "tag": "PutkemRFtDPkog7lh3aqbw",
  "recipients": [
    {
      "encrypted_key": "S_y3YPaLfjiwGz5o65BHciu14AZv-0J4Kzgtp2s7p7Q",
      "header": {
        "alg": "HPKE-P256-SHA256-A128GCM",
        "enc": "A128GCM",
        "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:bVviD6o
        OxaE-bCceWhaMYxOA7V-uy8fUl1xxvZ-Krvc",
        "psk_id": "our-pre-shared-key-id",
        "auth_kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:bV
        viD6oOxaE-bCceWhaMYxOA7V-uy8fUl1xxvZ-Krvc",
        "ek": "BKVLrAsOZ81MrTY3oyvSHnbBQWBp0viMZi0xYJkrOWcFIJThiyHkl
        LwplWoLQsQyE3xM6glXxWhJyb4LCzMGOLc"
      }
    }
  ]
}

The decoded protected header is:

{
  "enc": "A128GCM"
}

The decrypted plaintext is:

⌛ My lungs taste the air of Time Blown past falling sands ⌛

A.2.2. Example 3

This example demonstrates the use of Key Encryption with Auth Mode and a Pre shared key, JWE Additional Authenticated Data and General JWE JSON Serialization.

There is way to express a JWE with aad in Compact JWE Serialization.

{
  "protected": "eyJlbmMiOiJBMTI4R0NNIn0",
  "iv": "Koo4oayn9ooLgbKp",
  "ciphertext": "rGtay4qzhd_PyahVR7YcjmVd9txM1xndn74Bo5xGG3EIQJ5CPXl
  O7VqA8H_YDTWICdpoUWJbJNKI1wniEwhO",
  "tag": "Q68sYFCFFYH6CGXUbPcU0g",
  "aad": "cGF1bCBhdHJlaWRlcw",
  "recipients": [
    {
      "encrypted_key": "hSi_NAlaas0QarPbpESlBXuE9d204faW",
      "header": {
        "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:gnW5wb1
        7yYOST5_wEv87Y6Cf_bqF7dV5b0v_8Lxsrko",
        "alg": "ECDH-ES+A128KW",
        "epk": {
          "kty": "EC",
          "crv": "P-256",
          "x": "41mLA3QKwfhO9yWbPeMV6Xw35Vwpn1di6deLdK0kGjc",
          "y": "SzVzu3IWH6YaPA9DjgKh81jDcRvhcmRgpP9S_qEechU"
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "encrypted_key": "2WJXQE3eKLITL7m61gz4MXA37bE8QfPHjwnt0Kgq3u8",
      "header": {
        "alg": "HPKE-P256-SHA256-A128GCM",
        "enc": "A128GCM",
        "kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:1x34RWo
        fdglrdlAhqUJotlSnknAc0pcsarZtZPADNxk",
        "psk_id": "our-pre-shared-key-id",
        "auth_kid": "urn:ietf:params:oauth:jwk-thumbprint:sha-256:1x
        34RWofdglrdlAhqUJotlSnknAc0pcsarZtZPADNxk",
        "ek": "BLRK__E3XUC75sGRAo8de-wDasg_IDNcmmC-Lfnvk1S-uJ00fccdf
        TKKXgDeo4cGGYviPYdq7xhEWbAA4VpIxVg"
      }
    }
  ]
}

The decoded protected header is:

{
  "enc": "A128GCM"
}

The decrypted plaintext is:

⌛ My lungs taste the air of Time Blown past falling sands ⌛

The decoded aad is:

paul atreides

Acknowledgments

This specification leverages text from [I-D.ietf-cose-hpke]. We would like to thank Matt Chanda, Ilari Liusvaara, Aaron Parecki and Filip Skokan for their feedback.

Document History

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Authors' Addresses

Tirumaleswar Reddy
Nokia
Bangalore
Karnataka
India
Hannes Tschofenig
Austria
Aritra Banerjee
Nokia
Munich
Germany
Orie Steele
Transmute
United States
Michael B. Jones
Self-Issued Consulting
United States
URI: https://self-issued.info/