__END__

=pod

=head1 INTRODUCTION

When your application templates are just pure HTML5 files, it becomes easy for
the front-end developers to work with almost no coordination with the backend team.
Even if you buy a "website theme" from one of those online markets, which of
course wasn't developed to your application, it is very easy to slice it into
'layout', 'header', 'footer' and 'content' template files.

=head1 HTML vs TEXT

The distinction between text and HTML is very important, its the cause of the
L<XSS vulnerability|https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS)>.
This vulnerability got so common on the web because almost all template engines
are designed to process text. These engines can be used to render a config file,
a christmas letter, and also HTML.

Sure, all of those templating engines also provides a way to properly
HTML-escape a value, usualy in the form of filters. But being a text templating
engine they can't just HTML-escape values by default. The reality when using
that kind of engine is that developers can (and will) forget to add the proper
filters, or just don't know about this security vulnerability at all.

Plift is a template engine just for HTML, implemented on top of
libxml. Which means that for rendering text, we call L<XML::LibXML::Document/createTextNode>,
for attributes, L<XML::LibXML::Document/setAttribute> and for rendering the
final document we call L<XML::LibXML::Document/toStringHTML>. Libxml takes care
of the proper escaping.

Does it mean I'm immune to XSS vulnerability? No, you can still tell Plift to
render unescaped HTML, but its not the default.

=head1 jQuery-like API

Plift uses L<XML::LibXML::jQuery>, which provides a API to manipulate HTML that
most web developers are already familiar with.

I plan for a future Plift version to expose all features to an embedded
javascript runtime. 


=head1 AUTHOR

Carlos Fernando Avila Gratz E<lt>cafe@kreato.com.brE<gt>

=cut
